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Moreover, many of  the issues they raise are potentially 
controversial. The focus of  the conference was on the 
possibility of  climate change-related migration in the South 
Pacific, one of  the regions of  the world predicted to be most 
affected by the impacts of  climate change. The conference used 
regional examples of  situations where adverse environmental 
events and processes have already resulted in migration and 
displacement as a lens through which to consider the wider 
human mobility and humanitarian issues raised by climate 
change globally. The conference also considered policies 
at the national level (e.g., is it possible to achieve a holistic 
government approach on these matters?) and international 
level (e.g., why is the humanitarian impact of  climate change 
and more specifically environmentally-induced migration 
not included in the current United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)?)
To begin with, we wish to clarify our usage of  terms 
in this article. ‘Migration’ typically describes ‘a process of  
population movement, either across an international border 
or within a state, encompassing any kind of  movement of  
people, whatever its length, composition and causes, such as 
(but not limited to) migration of  refugees, displaced persons, 
uprooted people, and economic migrants’ (IOM, 2004, p.41; 
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Climate Change 
and Migration 
in the South Pacific Region: 
Policy Perspectives
Introduction
The aim of  this article1 is to outline some of  the key issues and themes 
discussed at the Institute of  Policy Studies symposium in July 2009 on 
‘Climate Change and Migration in the South Pacific Region: policy 
perspectives’. The linkages between climate change, environmental 
degradation and migration are manifold and not always clearly perceived. 
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see also Kilot, 2004, p.76). Often migration is divided into 
categories of  ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’, but in the context 
of  environmentally-induced migration the line between 
these groupings becomes blurred. Instead, one may try to 
imagine a continuum from clear cases of  forced migration 
to clear cases of  voluntary migration, with a large ‘grey 
zone’ in between (IOM, 2009, p.5). Exceptional cases are 
those of  movement for survival due to imminent or acute 
environmental disaster, for which the term displacement may 
be most appropriate (IOM, 2004, p.19).2 More generally, 
these and other phenomena related to the movement of  
people are subsumed under the larger concept of  human 
mobility. 
Importantly, no internationally accepted term exists 
to date for persons moving for environmental reasons. 
In an effort to capture the complexity and breadth of  the 
phenomenon, the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) has advanced the following working definition of  
environmental migrants: 
Environmental migrants are persons or groups of  persons 
who, predominantly for reasons of  sudden or progressive 
changes in the environment that adversely affect their 
lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their homes 
or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, 
and who move either within their country or abroad. 
(IOM, 2007; 2008, p.399)
For the purposes of  this article, the term climate change-
related migration (as a sub-category under the umbrella of  
environmentally-induced migration) will be employed to 
describe this new, relatively uncharted territory of  migration. 
The term recognises that climate change sensu strictu is unlikely 
to generate population movements, but rather does so via 
associated events and processes which affect the relationship 
between societies and their environment. 
The context 
To outline the context in which the conference was set, we 
wish to address three questions around which the different 
sessions of  the conference were organised, namely:
• What are the challenges in integrating migration in the 
climate change debate?
• Why now?
• Why the South Pacific region?
What are the challenges in integrating migration in the 
climate change debate?
Until comparatively recently the impact of  climate 
change on migration has remained largely beneath the 
domestic and international policy radar. This is despite 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
noting in its First Assessment Report that ‘the gravest effects 
of  climate change may be those on human migration’ 
(IPCC, 1990, p.103). A number of  reasons for this can be 
identified. 
First, the causes of  climate change-related migration are 
complex. Environmental factors have long had an impact on 
global migration flows. Environmental events and processes, 
both fast- and slow-onset, including 
cyclones, floods, desertification, soil erosion 
and changing coast lines, can induce 
migration. Environmental factors, however, 
interact with numerous other conditions in 
places of  origin and destination, including 
levels of  development, human rights and 
conflict, politics and governance, and issues 
at the individual and household level, such 
as age and gender. Climate change adds 
another layer to an already complex nexus 
between migration and the environment. 
This makes it difficult to establish clear-cut causal linkages 
between climate change and migration or to isolate 
environmental factors as exclusive drivers of  any particular 
migration phenomenon. Given the ‘hard evidence’-focused 
context in which climate change policy generally exists, 
the lack of  reliable data and of  unambiguous causalities in 
this area may have driven a misperception that the possible 
human mobility and humanitarian consequences of  climate 
change do not constitute a major policy problem. Linked 
to this is the fact that the consequences of  climate change 
for migration, although predictable in many cases, may not 
manifest themselves immediately. This may have fostered an 
impression that, if  at all, climate change-related migration is 
a policy problem of  the distant future.
Second, migration, and climate change-related migration 
even more so, is a truly cross-cutting phenomenon (Morton 
et al., 2008, p.5). This complexity means that no one policy 
community can claim exclusive ownership and drive it up 
the policy agenda. Furthermore, climate change-related 
migration raises difficult policy issues related to immigration, 
development, the environment and humanitarian assistance. 
Successful policy intervention in this area therefore requires 
policy coordination and a whole-of-government approach 
that can be difficult to engineer.
Third, with increased economic migration3 and a rise in 
the numbers of  persons claiming refugee status in the 1990s, 
migration has increasingly been discussed in security terms 
(Story, 2005, p.4; Volger, 2002, p.188). In the context of  a 
general ‘securitisation trend’, the movement of  people across 
borders too has increasingly been seen as a ‘security threat’. 
Similarly, climate change, via the potential of  its consequences 
... climate change-related migration raises 
difficult policy issues related to immigration, 
development, the environment and  
humanitarian assistance. 
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to cause violent conflict, has also increasingly been framed in 
these terms (see, for example, Barnett and Adger, 2007; Brown 
et al., 2007; Matthew, 2008; Schubert et al., 2008). This may 
mean that the likelihood of  migration being constructed as 
a positive policy solution in the climate change context may 
become subordinate to the ‘high politics of  security’ (Brown 
et al., 2007, p.1154). In other words, migration is seen as 
part of  the problem, not part of  a solution. Yet it is beyond 
any doubt that migration has been an adaptation strategy in 
the face of  environmental degradation and climate change 
adopted by individuals and sometimes whole communities 
for millennia (Brown, 2008, p.21).
Why now?
Scientific consensus is crystallising around 
a realisation that climate change, and more 
specifically anthropogenic climate change, is real 
and constitutes a near-term threat. Furthermore, 
there is a growing recognition that climate 
change and variability will exacerbate both the 
sudden and gradual environmental events and 
processes driving current patterns of  migration 
and displacement. In 2009 the challenges before 
the international community have come firmly 
into the political and public consciousness, as 
the United Nations Climate Change Conference 
2009 (COP15) in Copenhagen draws ever nearer. 
This meeting represents a critical milestone in the 
efforts to deal with the dangers posed by climate change at 
national, regional and international level. 
However, neither the human mobility implications of  
climate change nor its broader humanitarian consequences 
are acknowledged by the UNFCCC or its Kyoto Protocol. 
This omission is of  great concern to the humanitarian 
community as migration and displacement triggered by 
climate change cannot be systematically considered and 
properly addressed by the international community unless 
they are duly acknowledged within the UNFCCC process. 
While the text of  the UNFCCC speaks to the mitigation 
of  and adaptation to climate change, the idea that 
migration represents a potential adaptation strategy has not 
prominently featured in the context of  the UNFCCC. Where 
adaptation is linked to a particular context, these typically 
relate to ecological adaptation or planning for adaptation 
(see UNFCCC, 2007, articles 2, 4(1)(e), 4(1)(b)). There are 
also few instances in climate change literature which discuss 
migration as a potential adaptation strategy (see Adger et al., 
2007, p.736).4 
Overall, there is a need for an explicit recognition of  the 
human mobility and humanitarian consequences of  climate 
change in the successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. 
Leaving stark implications of  climate change for human 
mobility, affecting millions of  people all over the world, 
out of  the document that will be shaping and guiding the 
international response to climate change for the years to 
come would be a major gap. A window of  opportunity now 
exists to place the issue of  human mobility and humanitarian 
consequences of  climate change at the heart of  the 
international policy debate, and we hope that the peoples of  
the South Pacific can be part of  shaping this discussion.
Why the South Pacific region?
The South Pacific is not alone in facing climate change. It 
will affect all countries in some way at some time. But given 
the low elevation of  many South Pacific states, and their 
exposure to changing ocean weather patterns, it is likely that 
this region will feel the effects of  climate change before many 
others. In 2008 alone the region experienced a  number of  
natural disasters of  a kind likely to be exacerbated by climate 
change. For example, a devastating tropical cyclone (Gene) 
resulted in substantial damage to agriculture, infrastructure 
and utilities in Fiji, requiring the Fijian government to 
provide FJ$1.7 million worth of  food rations.5 Unusually 
high sea levels and swells have resulted in displacement of  
persons in Kiribati, Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands 
and the Federated States of  Micronesia (OCHA, 2008). Salt 
water intrusion into field and crops and contamination of  
freshwater aquifers has been reported in Solomon Islands 
(Webb, 2008, p.3). Low-lying atoll states such as Kiribati and 
Tuvalu are projected, at a certain threshold level of  climate 
change, to face the risk of  being completely overcome by the 
sea or otherwise rendered uninhabitable. 
Some states which see their territory threatened by 
climate change and consequent sea-level rise are currently 
exploring the possibility of  purchasing land in other states 
as a potential long-term solution for their populations. 
With regard to migration, some countries within the region 
are likely to produce some demand for migration to New 
Zealand. Indeed, we can already see examples within the 
region of  communities migrating internally to avoid complete 
inundation by rising sea levels, such as the relocation of  2,600 
islanders from the low-lying Carteret Islands to Bougainville, 
Papua New Guinea (Perry, 2006). These and other 
population movements in the Federated States of  Micronesia 
and in Vanuatu all point towards a future where migration 
may become an unavoidable response to climate change for 
households, communities and even entire nations. 
Some states which see their territory 
threatened by climate change and 
consequent sea-level rise are currently 
exploring the possibility of purchasing land 
in other states as a potential long-term 
solution for their populations. 
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The South Pacific region, therefore, is in the vanguard of  
regions already having to grapple with the human mobility 
consequences of  adverse events and processes which, if  not 
already caused by climate change, are likely to be exacerbated 
by climate change in the coming years, as indicated by the 
IPCC in its Fourth Assessment Report in 2007. Importantly, 
this cannot be simply dismissed as ‘bad luck’ due to the 
‘accident’ of  one’s geographical location. Given the 
significant anthropogenic nature of  current climate change 
and the inequities in carbon emissions which are at the root 
of  this change, there exists a moral obligation on the part of  
the international community to face up to these challenges. 
We believe, therefore, that the time has come to firmly put 
the issue of  migration and displacement at the heart of  the 
debate around the policy responses to climate change. As 
a region, the South Pacific provides a suitable lens through 
which to examine wider policy issues raised by migration in 
the context of  climate change. 
Some key policy challenges
Understanding the potential scale and patterns of climate 
change-related migration 
The numbers of  persons predicted to be at risk of  being 
displaced due to climate change-related environmental events 
and processes represents something of  a wild card in this 
area. Quite simply, there is no scientifically verified estimate 
of  projected population flows. ‘Guesstimates’ range from 50 
million to 1 billion. The most commonly cited figure is of  
around 200 million persons displaced by climate change by 
2050 (Brown, 2008, p.11, citing Myers, 1993). To put this in 
perspective, this figure equates to what the IOM currently 
estimates to be the total number of  migrants worldwide.6 
Some estimates have, like much of  the climate change debate, 
a sensationalist element to them which can have negative 
effects on public and political opinion. This dearth of  
accurate statistical and substantive information on the possible 
migratory consequences of  climate change impedes our ability 
to adequately prepare for and comprehensively respond to 
the humanitarian and protection needs of  environmental 
migrants. The extent to which migration occurs in the coming 
decades will, in large measure, depend on which of  the IPCC’s 
emission scenarios (SRES) comes to pass. We need, as a first 
step, to obtain an accurate picture as to the potential scale and 
patterns of  climate change-related migration. 
It is likely that mass displacement will occur in many 
parts of  the world as a result of  sudden-onset events (e.g. 
storms, cyclones, flooding) made more intense or frequent (or 
both) as a result of  climate change. However, an even greater 
number of  people are likely to migrate because of  slow-
onset processes, at both early and more advanced stages of  
environmental degradation (e.g. sea-level rise, coastal erosion, 
desertification, declining soil fertility). At early stages of  
environmental degradation, individuals and households may 
engage in temporary or circular forms of  migration, such 
as seasonal, rural-urban migration. Where environmental 
degradation is more severe and/or irreversible, resulting 
migration can require relocation of  affected populations 
either internally or to a third country and may become 
permanent. Climate change-related migration may take 
place internally, regionally or internationally. Most empirical 
research, however, suggests that internal migration, mainly as 
rural-urban migration, or cross-border movement between 
neighbouring countries, are likely to be the predominant 
patterns (see generally Leighton, 2007, 1998).
Key issues in this context include:
• How many people will migrate and where? 
• What migration patterns and volumes emerge in response 
to different environmental stressors? 
• How can migration and environment datasets be 
enhanced and/or harmonised? 
• How can household surveys be better utilised? 
Understanding the complexity and multi-
causality of climate change-related migration
As outlined above, migration decisions 
are influenced by social, economic and 
political factors, as well as individual 
characteristics such as age, gender, 
education, skills, risk-taking capacity, 
capacity to face new situations and the 
like. The extent to which environmental 
factors determine migration will depend 
on the underlying adaptive capacities of  
individuals, communities and countries. 
There exists a need to better understand how people cope 
with the ‘shocks and stresses’ of  climate change and climate 
variability, and, in particular, the extent to which migration 
forms part of  the adaptation strategy (Kniveton et al., 2008, 
p.37). In this regard, it is important to note that there is a lack 
of  contemporary empirical studies as to how perceptions of  
climate change have influenced migration decisions made by 
individuals, households and communities (ibid., p.33). It is 
clear, however, that the use of  migration as an adaptation 
strategy is not open to everyone; it depends on resources, 
information and other social and personal factors. Often it is 
precisely the most vulnerable and the most severely affected 
who are not in a position to migrate. 
More specifically, there may be differentiated gender 
impacts that must be expressly factored into the policy-
making process. In general terms, women are expected to 
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as an adaptation strategy is not open to 
everyone; it depends on resources,  
information and other social and personal 
factors.
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be particularly vulnerable to impacts of  climate change as a 
result of  existing gender inequalities which limit their access 
to information and decision-making power. This increased 
vulnerability is also a function of  their frequently insecure 
property rights and access to resources, as well as of  their 
reduced mobility due to caring for children and the elderly 
in situations of  environmental stress (see generally IUCN, 
2008, p.57; OHCHR, 2009; UNIFEM, 2008). Additionally, 
there are regionally specific gender implications (UNDP, 
2008). In some Pacific communities (e.g. the Carterets in 
Papua New Guinea and some outer islands in Yap in the 
Federated States of  Micronesia (cited by Cheryl Anderson 
in UNDP, 2008)), systems of  land management and/or 
holding are matrilineal. Furthermore, women in the Pacific 
have traditionally engaged in collecting seafood within in-
shore areas. As a result, coastal erosion may affect women 
differently than men who are traditionally engaged more 
in deep-sea fishing. In each case, loss of  land would have a 
potentially significant impact on families and communities as 
a whole, and on gender relations within these communities. 
It is, however, important not to see Pacific women only as 
victims of  climate change. Women have significant roles in 
traditional methods of  disaster risk reduction, and may also 
possess valuable knowledge about changes to their physical 
environment (see generally Campbell, 2006).
The impact of  climate change is also likely 
to be particularly acute for many indigenous 
communities. Also often having limited access 
to information and decision-making power, 
indigenous communities are particularly 
vulnerable due to their inhabiting of  marginal 
land and reliance on ecosystems and ecosystem 
services that are susceptible to climate change. 
There may be disruption to systems of  traditional 
knowledge. For example, in some parts of  Solomon 
Islands livelihoods are already beginning to be 
affected by changes to wind patterns which are disrupting 
traditional sources of  knowledge around crop planting 
(ICRC, 2008). Displacement away from traditional places of  
settlement may involve significant heritage and cultural loss, 
creating a profound sense of  alienation and trauma.
Key issues in this context include:
• What are the causal links between migration, 
environmental events and processes and climate change 
and to what extent is the environment the primary 
driver? 
• How do climatic and environmental drivers interact with 
social, political and economic motivations for migration?
• What are the gendered impacts of  climate change and 
how do they affect migration? 
• What may be the impact of  climate change on indigenous 
persons and communities? 
Managing climate change-related migration
In view of  the variegated and complex challenges at hand, 
migration management responses to impacts of  climate 
change and environmental degradation on migration and 
displacement must operate on several tracks. Firstly, given 
the environmental scenarios expected to arise with climate 
change in the future, the effectiveness of  humanitarian 
response mechanisms to displacement and its negative 
impacts needs to be reinforced as much as possible. In addition 
to that, proactive approaches, in terms of  preparedness and 
disaster risk reduction, must become a priority.
Secondly, while migration is still predominantly seen as 
a worst-case scenario, and there are indubitably cases where 
this holds true, migration should also be recognised as an 
adaption strategy. In fact, attempts to stem migration at all 
cost may increase rather than decrease people’s vulnerability 
to environmental pressures. If  it is accepted that migration 
is a coping strategy adopted by at least some persons or 
communities in the face of  environmental degradation, it 
is in our view at least open to serious debate as to whether 
migration, in the context of  climate change, should be 
characterised as solely a failure of  adaptation. Whether this 
is so will depend largely on the point at which migration 
takes place in relation to the underlying environmental event 
or process, and what other non-migratory options (if  any) are 
available. Regardless, there is room to increase the adaptive 
capacities of  individuals, households and communities. 
Appropriate policies are needed to facilitate migration as an 
adaptation in and of  itself, while simultaneously trying to 
limit instances of  forced migration. The role of  sustainable 
development is crucial in this equation. The developmental 
basis of  communities and countries is decisive for any national 
or regional policies on adaptation to climate change (including 
the National Adaptation Programme of  Action created 
within the UNFCCC process) and on migration. Migration 
itself  can be mobilised as an adaptation or development 
strategy, for example where migrant remittances contribute 
to income diversification for households otherwise relying on 
diminishing ecosystem services. 
More globally, other questions that arise in this context 
include whether potential risk linked to climate change 
becomes a factor in national-level migration policy making. 
If  so, what weight should it be given? Can seasonal or other 
time-bound policies be implemented? Would this be effective 
considering the long timeframe needed to reverse climatic 
processes such as desertification and sea-level rise?
Key issues in this context include:
• What policies and initiatives currently exist to address 
... attempts to stem migration at all cost 
may increase rather than decrease people’s 
vulnerability to environmental pressures. 
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internal and international migration, from prevention 
and mitigation policies to return and reintegration? 
• What lessons can be learned from existing government 
responses? 
• How can we reduce vulnerability to disaster-induced 
displacement? 
• How can migration be used as part of  adaptation 
strategies? 
• How can capacity be built to implement such policies? 
Finding workable definitions and solutions under international law
As noted in the introduction, people migrating for 
environmental reasons do not fall squarely within any one 
category of  ‘forced’ or ‘voluntary’ migration, and as such, 
they also do not fit neatly into the categories provided by 
the existing international legal framework. Terms such as 
‘environmental refugee’ (El-Hinnawi, 1985, p.4) or ‘climate 
change refugee’ have gained much popular currency, 
but do not have any legal basis in international refugee 
law.7 Moreover, there is consensus among concerned 
agencies, including the Office of  the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), that their use is to be 
avoided as these terms are misleading and could potentially 
undermine the international legal regime for the protection 
of  convention refugees (IOM, 2009, pp.4-5; UNHCR, 2008, 
p.7).8 It is largely for this reason that the IOM proposes the 
working definition of  ‘environmental migrants’. 
Definitions matter as they determine entitlement to rights 
and establish the threshold for accessing any protection 
regime (Dun and Gemenne, 2008, p.11). Should protection 
be limited to situations of  forced migration or displacement? 
But given the complexity of  the task of  deciding, hard and 
fast, what constitutes ‘forced migration’ in the context of  
climate change, is this realistic and practicable, or will it 
inevitably leave many without rights and protection? 
The situation of  those migrating or displaced due to 
environmental factors raises significant and complex issues of  
international law. Particular challenges arise in the context of  
shrinking or disappearing states – a phenomenon predicted 
under some scenarios to manifest in the South Pacific. The 
following are but a few examples of  the existing international 
legal concepts and instruments and some associated problems 
which may provide guidance to policy makers:
Human rights. There is little doubt that climate change 
events and processes will have an impact on human rights in 
different ways (see generally OHCHR, 2009 and International 
Council on Human Rights Policy, 2008). Respect for human 
rights must be an integral part of  any policy response to the 
migration and displacement consequences of  climate change, 
no matter how the motivations for movement are defined. 
The work of  treaty-monitoring bodies has meant that the 
content of  the civil and political, and economic, social and 
cultural rights recognised under binding multilateral treaties 
is better understood and an expanding set of  standards 
has been developed to guide rights-sensitive policy making. 
The potential for existing international human rights, 
humanitarian and/or refugee law to offer protection to the 
rights of  those migrating or displaced due to climate change 
needs to be fully explored. 
Statelessness. The international law regime on statelessness9 
is designed to deal with issues of  deprivation of  nationality 
following state succession or conflict of  nationality law. It 
has not been designed to deal with questions arising where 
no successor state exists and the predecessor state has 
disappeared, as may occur in relation to some small island 
states. In the context of  climate change, does the law require 
that all or just the habitable parts of  the territory disappear?10 
If  these states are declared to continue to exist in some legal 
sense, their populations will not be de jure stateless, to which 
the international regime largely responds. Their lack of  an 
effective nationality means they may well be considered de 
facto stateless persons, for whom the protection regime is 
weaker.
Self-determination. Complete loss of  territory will have a 
significant impact on the rights of  the affected peoples to 
self-determination,11 which has internal and external aspects 
(Joseph et al., 2004, p.146; Nowak, 1993, p.22). The internal 
aspects relate to freedom to pursue economic, social and 
cultural development, and include participation in political 
processes. The external aspects relate to freedom from foreign 
domination and the right of  peoples to freely determine their 
political status and place in the international community. 
While some aspects of  internal self-determination can be 
accommodated through the democratic process of  the host 
country and its existing obligations under international 
human rights law,12 how will these rights survive in full with 
the complete loss of  territory without sovereignty being 
established over other territory? Similarly, how can displaced 
peoples exercise their right to freely dispose of  their natural 
resources, including maritime resources?13 Finally, cultural 
identity is intimately bound up with particular territory, the 
loss of  which is likely to pose a challenge for the protection 
of  cultural development.
Internal displacement. The Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, although technically a non-binding, soft-
law document, have been influential in shaping how states 
respond to the predicament of  the internally displaced.14 
Importantly, the Guiding Principles have been one source 
of  inspiration behind the Draft African Union Kampala 
Convention on Internally Displaced Persons, which shows 
how soft-law instruments can, in time, solidify into hard-law 
instruments.15 ‘Hard-law’ policy instruments may be not 
be attractive to states, particularly when the potential scale 
of  the obligations assumed is unknown. A ‘soft-law track’, 
following ‘framework’ and ‘protocol’ approach, may the 
most workable route to ensure the rights and protection of  
those migrating or displaced due to environmental factors.
Key issues in this context include:
• What rights do environmental migrants have? How can 
those migrating or displaced for environmental reasons 
be best protected? 
• What are the definitions and concepts needed and do 
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they already exist under international law?
• What are the strengths and limitations of  existing 
definitions under international law; how can they be 
improved? 
• Does calling those displaced in this context ‘refugees’ 
weaken its currency or does a failure to do so weaken the 
case for their legitimate claims for protection? 
• What is the role of  hard-law versus soft-law instruments in 
this debate?
Conclusion 
Having reviewed some of  the critical issues, how best, then, 
to ensure effective and equitable responsibility-sharing in 
respect of  climate change-related migration? One of  the 
most significant obstacles that had to be overcome to secure 
the UNFCCC was the negotiations involved in reconciling 
divergent state interests (see Bodansky, 1993, pp.475-7). It 
seems clear from this experience that trying to create a global 
binding agreement may not be the best, or at the very least the 
most feasible, course. It must also be open to debate whether 
a regional approach is the best one in terms of  reaching some 
international agreement on climate change-related migration. 
What, we ask, does ‘region’ mean in this context, and how 
might different actors within a region share responsibility for 
the issue? More fundamentally, given the truly global nature 
of  climate change and the historical provenance of  current 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, is it appropriate or fair to 
take a regional approach? At the same time, it may be possible 
to draw upon existing regionally-situated arrangements of  
inter-communal and inter-island cooperation in the wake of  
natural disasters (see Campbell, 2006, p.23).
A fundamental issue to consider is whether it is desirable 
to frame this issue in such zero-sum terms. Would a hybrid 
model involving global, regional and, importantly, bilateral 
features perhaps be better suited? While the most effective 
burden-sharing arrangements are likely to occur at the 
regional level, the fact that all states will, to some extent, be 
affected by climate change means that, ideally, the agreement 
should also contain an element of  global management. Also, 
the South Pacific states are not individually or collectively 
responsible for the current build-up of  dangerous atmospheric 
GHG levels. 
To conclude: it is, in our view, vitally important that in 
seeking to find policy solutions to an issue of  global importance 
the bilateral dimension is not overlooked. It is individual states 
which, in the exercise of  their own sovereign rights and taking 
into account historical, cultural and other ties, will have to 
decide the contours of  their policy response to climate change-
related migration. Bilateral state cooperation is an important 
feature of  contemporary global migration management and 
must be enhanced in this particular context. Nevertheless, to 
be truly effective and equitable, such bilateral arrangements 
must be informed and guided by relevant regional and global 
arrangements and processes. In particular, they must be 
guided by the UNFCCC and a successor agreement to the 
Kyoto Protocol, in which we hope to see the human mobility 
implications and humanitarian consequences of  climate 
change expressly acknowledged, and which together will 
guide the overarching political approach and mechanisms for 
practical implementation of  relevant programmes to assist 
the affected populations. 
We believe that by disaggregating the issues of  ‘who 
goes where and when?’ and ‘who pays?’ while aligning them 
in an interconnected and mutually-reinforcing series of  
global, regional and bilateral responses under the umbrella 
of  the UNFCCC, it is possible to envisage responsibility-
sharing arrangements with variable but broadly balanced 
commitments and responsibilities.
1 This article was originally drafted as a position paper and distributed to delegates at the 
Institute of Policy Studies conference ‘Climate Change and Migration in the South Pacific 
Region: policy perspectives’, held in Wellington on 9 and 10 July 2009. The opinions 
expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the IPS. The designations employed 
and the presentation of material do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever 
on the part of the IOM and IPS concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city 
or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries. The authors wish 
to acknowledge with thanks Karoline Popp, associate migration officer; Patrice Quesada, 
associate expert; and Agatha S. Tan, intern, all at the International Dialogue on Migration 
Division at the IOM, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
2 Displacement is defined as a forced removal of a person from his/her home or country, often 
due to armed conflict or natural disasters.
3 Economic migrants are defined as persons leaving their habitual place of residence to settle 
outside his/her country of origin in order to improve his/her quality of life (IOM, 2004, p.21). 
4 In many other instances it is not acknowledged or explored in any detail. For example, 
discussing small island developing states, a recent report by the UNFCCC secretariat notes 
that the habitability and thus sovereignty of some states are threatened due to reduction 
in island size or complete inundation. However, this stark vulnerability is not separated out 
from other vulnerabilities of a lesser order of magnitude (UNFCCC, 2007, p.25). See also 
UNFCCC, 2007, p.42 noting that migration might result, but the profound policy issues raised 
are simply not dealt with.
5 $1.7 million for tropical cyclone Gene rehabilitation (Relief Web: Fiji, 12 February 2008, 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc104?OpenForm&rc=5&cc=fji).
6 See http://www.iom/it/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/facts-and-figures/global-estimates-and-
trends.
7 Note, however, that there may be exceptional cases in which environmental factors combine 
with discriminatory modes of governance and constitute persecution. See here Burson 
(2008). 
8 Furthermore, regional instruments such as the 1969 AU/OAU Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on 
Refugees have expanded refugee definitions covering ‘events seriously disturbing public 
order’. While they were not intended to cover displacement as a result of natural disasters 
per se (see, e.g., Epsiell at al., 1990, p.96; Cuellar et al., 1991, p.493; Muzenda, 1995, 
p.51), they may provide some impetus for further progressive regional interpretation of the 
refugee definition.
9 The primary international instruments are the 1930 Hague Convention, the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness. The principles underlying these instruments are supported by provisions 
in other treaties, such as the 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, the 
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. See also the 1997 European Convention on 
Nationality. 
10 The best-known formulation of the basic criteria for ‘statehood’ includes criteria such as 
the existence of a defined territory and a permanent population. See Crawford, 1979, p.36; 
Grant, 1999, p.5.
11 Article 1(1) of the ICCPR and ICESCR: ‘all peoples have the right to freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.
12 In particular, the ICCPR and ICESCR. 
13 See article 1(2) of ICCPR and ICESCR. As Paskal (2007, p.5) asks, ‘Does this require Tuvalu, 
for example, to tether a boat to its former island and keep a few people there to continue to 
claim these rights?’
14 E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2: ‘persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged 
to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result 
of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, 
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed 
an internationally recognized State border’. This definition could foreseeably cover all those 
forcibly displaced within their country due to the effects of climate change. 
15 Similarly, the Cartagena Declaration was the product of a colloquium attended by experts 
and representatives from 10 Central American governments and, although strictly non-
binding, it has been influential in setting policy in the region.
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